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Abstract 
In analysing the role of the United States in the global expansion of capitalist relations, most 
critical accounts see the US military’s invasion and conquest of various states as paving the way 
for the arrival of US businesses and capitalist relations. However, beyond this somewhat 
simplified image, and even in peacetime, the US military has been a major geoeconomic actor 
who has wielded its infrastructural power, via its US Army Corps of Engineers’ overseas 
activities. The transformation of global economies in the twentieth century has depended on the 
capitalisation of the newly independent states and the consolidation of liberal capitalist relations 
in the subsequent decades. The US Army Corps of Engineers has not only extended lucrative 
contracts to private firms (based not only in the US and host country, but also geopolitically 
allied states), but perhaps most important, the Corps itself has established a grammar of capitalist 
relations. It has done so by forging both physical infrastructures (roads, ports, utilities and 
telecommunications infrastructures) and virtual capitalist infrastructures through its practices of 
contracting, purchasing, design, accounting, regulatory processes and specific regimes of labour 
and private property ownership. 
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What is the relationship between the United States military and the capitalisation of economies 
in the Global South? In the aftermath of the US War on Terror, an oft-heard argument saw the 
US military’s invasion of Iraq as either a war for oil, or as a means of facilitating the entry of US 
businesses into Iraq.  While it is easy to find arguments about how the US pacification of 
intransigent peoples overseas has paved the way for the entry of US businesses, this scholarship 
does not necessarily attend to the deliberate and systematic way that the US military has acted in 
peacetime to construct new economic infrastructures that incorporated the pacified countries 
into the global capitalist economy. The main contention of this article is that the US military has 
used infrastructural power as a primary modality of establishing liberal capitalist relations in 
countries in transition and in times of global political and economic transformation. This 
argument requires us to take seriously the importance both of the peacetime work of US military 
institution in advancing global capitalism, as well as the importance of forms of power that do 
not easily fit within the rubric of economic or military.  Rather, through both forceful and 
hegemonic means, US military institutions have forged the necessary scaffolding for a capitalist 
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economy and its concomitant features of racialised labour exploitation, new private property 
regimes, and new discourses, standards, laws, and practices. 
In this article, I will argue that the transnational role of the US military as a wielder of capitalist 
infrastructural power has to be taken into account when we think of the spread and consolidation of 
capitalist relations throughout the twentieth century. This role includes not only the US military’s 
provision of large contracts to private businesses but also especially through the construction of 
the physical and virtual infrastructures that underlie the emergence of liberal capitalism overseas. 
Nor is this activity limited to wartime. In fact, it is in moments of global economic and political 
transition, and in ostensible peacetime, that the US military’s infrastructural power has been a 
dispositif central to the task of disseminating liberal capitalism. Michel Foucault (1980: 194) has 
identified a dispositif as “a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions” that encourage a particular 
regime of power. In this instance, these infrastructures encourage liberal capitalist production 
and consumption. Attending to infrastructures allows us to see the palimpsest of power and 
social relations that has been consolidated within these often invisible but fundamental 
ingredients of forms of control and rule.  
The central concepts which frame my argument are infrastructural power and geoeconomics, 
which I will define in the sections that follow. A significant function of infrastructural power in 
the service of capitalist relations is the facilitation of circulation (of goods, people and capital), as 
set forth in Michel Foucault’s Security, Territory, Population. The particular period I examine is the 
post-Second World War period when economies of the global South were capitalised during the 
Cold War. In this period circulation of goods and capital encouraged capital accumulation and 
the establishment of normative systems of governance. The specific case I will analyse is the 
extensive programme of civilian and military infrastructure building which the US Army Corps 
of Engineers implemented in the Middle East, and Saudi Arabia more specifically, after the end 
of the Second World War.  
To do so, I shall delineate the range of scholarship that examines the relationship between 
militaries and capital in overseas and domestic social and economic activities. I shall discuss the 
lacunae in this scholarship as regards the US military’s geoeconomic role worldwide. I will then 
lay out a brief sketch of the activities of the US military in the Arabian Peninsula since the end of 
the Second World War, drawing on archival research, publications by the US military (and 
especially the US Army Corps of Engineers), and official histories produced by the US military. I 
will then analyse the significance of the US Army Corps of Engineers’ activities in the Peninsula 
by drawing on both critical political geographies that introduce the concept of geoeconomics as 
well as Foucault’s discussion of circulation as a means not only of business but of government. I 
ultimately argue that to understand how many countries in the global South were incorporated 
into the global liberal capitalist sphere, we have to accept that many of our conceptual categories 
of public/private, state/corporation, domestic/foreign, or civilian/military are simply 
inadequate.  Rather, I argue that we have to take account of how physical and virtual 
infrastructures were crucial to the capitalisation of the economies of the global South. And the 
US Army Corps of Engineers’ role in the making of these infrastructures in the Arabian 
Peninsula shows that an arm of the US military could act as a local agent of government 
overseas, and as a business actor central to how decisions were made about the emplacement of 
these infrastructures, who financed their construction, who built them, how they were built, who 
used them, and who ultimately benefited from them. 
I have chosen to focus on the US Army Corps of Engineers’ activities in the Arabian Peninsula 
for reasons having to do both with the geographical location, and with the US military itself.  In 
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a sense, the transformation of the Peninsula’s economy from one that was based on mercantile 
trade to modern forms of capitalist production and new forms of incorporation into global trade 
is a clear instance of the transformation of the global South in the twentieth century. The case of 
Saudi Arabia is productive because so much of the transformation of the economy of the 
country and its embedding in global capitalism was the work of the Arabian American Oil 
Company (ARAMCO; under its earlier label as California Arabian Standard Oil Company or 
CASOC), but the functioning of ARAMCO could not be separated from the work of the US 
military. Further, Saudi Arabia is all too often understood through the lens of rentierism without 
attending to the familiar ways in which it functions as a capitalist economy. I have also chosen to 
focus on the US military, because the fascinating, decades-long, activity of the US Army Corps 
of Engineers in the Middle East as an entrepreneurial agent of capitalist infrastructural power allows 
us to question verities about the supposed differences between militaries and governments in the 
global South and the global North. 
 
Militaries and capitalist relations 
While political and social lives and afterlives of militaries have always loomed large in 
international relations literature, the political economy of militaries became a more significant 
object of IR scholarship in recent decades with a focus on military expenditures, procurement 
policies and defence budgeting (O’Hanlon, 2009; Ruttan, 2006). The privatisation of military 
functions that accelerated after the neoliberal turn, and in particular the outsize role of both 
military contractors and mercenaries in the ongoing US War on Terror, have been other aspects 
of such studies (Avant, 2005; Kinsey and Patterson, 2012; Kinsey, 2009; Singer, 2003; Stanger, 
2009; Verkuil, 2007).  These works engaged with the legal, political and economic effect of such 
activities and were particularly concerned with how such privatisation influenced military 
effectiveness, state sovereignty, and legal accountability.  
Further, a rich body of scholarship has scrutinised the role of militaries as economic actors; but 
this research –often developed by area studies scholars– has been almost entirely focused on the 
domestic sphere and largely not within the disciplinary boundaries of International Relations 
(Grawert and Abul-Magd, 2016; Kandil, 2012; Marshall, 2015; Siddiqa, 2007). The edited volume 
by Grawert and Abul-Magd has excellent case studies of the militaries in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, 
Libya, Pakistan, Syria, Sudan, Turkey, and Yemen. A similar volume by Brömmelhörster and 
Paes covers Argentina, Central America, China, Congo, Indonesia, Pakistan, Vietnam, and “the 
largest European army in business,” Russia. However, strikingly, in the introduction to these 
cases, the editors omit Russia from their overarching analysis, and consider military businesses a 
malfunction characteristic only of the global South (Brömmelhörster and Paes, 2003: 2).  
Tarak Barkawi (2016: 2013) has written about a Eurocentric insistence in International Relations 
on excluding the role of war and militaries in the development of European societies. I argue 
that this inability to see the workings of militaries from the global North as also facilitating 
businesses, acting as business agents, or being implicated in spreading capitalist economies 
worldwide is itself an element of this blind spot. While the scholars I have cited above illuminate 
the practices of militaries of global South as potentially outside the norms of governance, what I 
show in this article is that the world’s most powerful military has been crucial in enacting the 
geoeconomic interests of the US. The transnational economic role of the Northern militaries –
not simply as facilitators of the work of private firms (via logistics and procurement contracts), but 
as engines for the production and consolidation of liberal capitalist relations– requires further 
study. This article aims to contribute to this field of research. 
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“Commerce, war, and transit”2 
In his Sources of Social Power, Michael Mann (1986: 170) describes infrastructural power as “the 
capacity to actually penetrate society and to implement logistically political decisions” and 
considers its components to include elements of a common culture (such as literacy) as well as 
what he calls “legionary economy, or Rome’s version of compulsory cooperation” (1986: 297). 
This was as much a kind of centralised power that ensured some minimal cooperation from the 
ruled as it was about creating the physical infrastructures of rule (including fundamental 
necessities of economic operations, such as irrigation systems or roads). I use the phrase 
somewhat differently.  
In this article, infrastructural power means the authority and power to forge and maintain the 
assemblage of practices, discourses, physical fixtures, laws and procedures necessary for the 
government of subjects and citizens, including their economies. This power emanates not only 
from bodies associated with states (e.g. public work ministries or in this article, the Corps of 
Engineers) but also overlapping institutions and organisations, whether parastatal or ostensibly 
private, that serve to bolster this power.3 The ultimate aim of infrastructural power is the 
(re)production and enforcement of capitalist relations.  
Historians have illuminated the process by which militaries in the global North have developed 
both physical and virtual infrastructures that have in turn enabled the emergence of capitalist 
economies, new business sectors, and modern modalities of government (Edgerton, 2013; 
Epstein, 2014; Ruttan, 2006).  Transport infrastructures in particular have acted interchangeably 
as conduits of commerce and arteries of war-making, particularly in the nineteenth century when 
the necessity of moving troops and supplies across the European continent further encouraged 
large-scale investment in railways and roads (van Creveld, 1977; Wolmar, 2012).  A crucial 
corollary and benefit of this fungible infrastructure was that the military could “organize the 
resources of this or that town and set up a market” (van Creveld, 1977: 7), which in turn 
incorporated the conquered terrain into commercial and economic networks. War and 
commerce went hand-in-hand. 
The same process also occurred in the colonies. Paul Rabinow’s magisterial account of French 
colonial modernity (1995:148) is particularly acute in its portrayal of how Marshals Gallieni and 
Lyautey brought with their wars of pacification new political economies and forms of 
government.  He writes of Gallieni’s post-conquest work in Indochina: 
Gallieni’s interest was infrastructural and instrumental. In village after village, he 
covetously and proudly noted every new bridge and road built; the French were spinning 
a growing spider’s web of installations-and Gallieni was the spider.  Roads were the key; 
without them there could be no movement of troops, no commerce, and ultimately no 
society. Gallieni was adamant that posts be constructed in durable materials, to 
demonstrate that the French intended to remain permanently. 
The centrality of conquering militaries in establishing fungible military and commercial 
infrastructures in colonial settings was widespread and not limited to the French (Headrick, 
1990; Tripodi, 2009). The British railways in India transported commodities and troops. British 
sea power depended on both naval and commercial mastery (Kennedy, 2017). Rosa Luxemburg 
(2003: 401-402), in her account of railway building in Argentina, saw them not only as 
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produced by the modern distribution of disciplinary power. 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Sage in European Journal of International Relations. 
Published version available from: https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066117742955 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25076/ under licence 
CC-BY-NC 4.0 International  
 
 5 
“spread[ing] commodity economy” but also “pav[ing] the way for military occupation”.  What is 
particularly notable about the Luxemburg passage is that she periodises this infrastructure 
construction in a moment of transformation of global economies. She discusses how 
“capitalisation demands the progressive supercession of simple commodity production by 
capitalist economy”; “the employment of international capital in the construction of the 
international railway network” is the enabler of the process (2003: 401).  Everywhere, 
capitalisation of global economies required both force for protection, and investment in far-flung 
places in infrastructures (also see Thorner, 1950). 
In the European context, this decisive moment –of the emergence of territory as the space of 
government, populations as object of government, and security as the mechanism of 
government–is the subject of Michel Foucault’s Security, Territory, Population (2004).  There, 
Foucault reflects on the mutual interdependence of police –the domestic apparatus of security– 
and commerce:  
Finally, the last object of police [after “the number of men”, “necessities of life”, “the 
problem of health”, and “the activity of this population”] is circulation, the circulation of 
goods, of the products of men’s activity. This circulation should be understood first of all 
in the sense of the material instruments with which it must be provided. Thus police will 
be concerned with the condition and development of roads, and with the navigability of 
rivers and canals, etcetera… So the space of circulation is a privileged object for police 
(2004: 325). 
Foucault is of course focused on the moment at which capitalist relations and new forms of 
government are becoming the prevalent dispositif within the national space of European states.  
His historical account is instructive in understanding that so much of the physical and virtual 
infrastructures that were required for the circulation of goods, capital and people were developed 
and regulated by the state’s coercive bodies. The police in Foucault’s account is a great wielder of 
the kind of infrastructural power of which I have written. 
Given Foucault’s oft-commented-upon reluctance to extend his analysis to the colonial setting, 
the discussion of policing of circulation across national boundaries requires some theoretical 
adjustments. Here, the government of circulation requires the control of trade routes – not only 
lubricating the movements of goods and peoples but also sometimes circumscribing them. The 
production and attenuation of scarcity is as much a part of establishing the parameters of 
capitalisation in Asia and Africa as is the facilitation of European commerce at the expense of 
the global South (Rodney, 1982: 160-161; on “oil scarcity ideology” see Stern, 2013). “Limit[ing] 
the development of independent conduits” for the circulation of commodities and 
“maintain[ing] a grid of alternative supply routes and sources” (Mitchell, 2011: 163) has very 
frequently been the work of European commercial firms. In an imperial setting, a coercive force 
projected transnationally, a military acting as a global police, could also serve to both expand and 
constrict these routes and conduits of circulation along the lines Foucault delineated in Security, 
Territory, Population.   
But beyond this regulation of scarcity and circulation, the militaries of the global North, and the 
US military in particular also served another characteristic of “circulation” discussed by Foucault.  
Foucault considers circulation as  
not only this material network that allows the circulation of goods and possibly of men, 
but also the circulation itself, that is to say, the set of regulations, constraints, and limits, or the 
facilities and encouragements that will allow the circulation of men and things in the kingdom and 
possibly beyond its borders (2004: 325; emphasis added). 
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It is to understand this regulatory dispositif in an overseas context that I want to introduce 
geoeconomics as a central concept into this essay. In a sense, if Foucault’s model conceptualises 
the uses of infrastructural power for the (re)production of capitalist relations within the 
boundaries of European nation-states, the concept of geoeconomics is the global conduit which 
allows for the projection of this infrastructural power across the surface of the earth, and 
especially in colonial or neo-colonial countries. 
Geoeconomics as a concept was first used by Edward Luttwak in a now famous National Interest 
article in which he argued that “force has lost the role it once had in the age of mercantilism - as 
an admissible adjunct to economic competition” (1990: 21). In this world of geoeconomics, “the 
methods of commerce are displacing military methods - with disposable capital in lieu of 
firepower, civilian innovation in lieu of military-technical advancement, and market penetration 
in lieu of garrisons and bases”, entailing a reconfiguration of “regulations, benefits, services, and 
infrastructures” with the aim of global domination (1990: 21). Critical geographers, including 
especially Deborah Cowen and Neil Smith, have argued for the utility of the concept in 
understanding “conflicts between the logics of territorial states and global economic flows, the 
proliferation of non-state and private actors entangled in security, and the recasting of 
citizenship and social forms” (Cowen and Smith, 2009: 25; also Smith, 2003; Morrissey, 2017).  
Cowen and Smith, however, do not argue for “a simple historical succession from geopolitical to 
geoeconomic logics” (2009: 25), but rather for “the geographical unevenness and radical 
incompleteness of this geoeconomic transition” (2009: 38).   
Deborah Cowen (2014) has herself shown how global logistical infrastructures are crucial to 
contemporary geoeconomic domination.  She traces the ease with which military encampments 
can become logistics hubs; and how logistical infrastructures can accelerate or slow down 
economic domination of some parts of the world over others. This connection between security 
and commerce is also made in Marc Levinson’s absorbing history of the shipping container 
(2006), where containers used to transport materiel to the theatre of war in Vietnam in the 1960s 
were then utilised by Japanese electronics manufacturers to export their goods to the US, thus 
transforming trade patterns between the two countries.  
This persistent transaction between commercial and security interests is also the subject of this 
article. What I argue is that in a time of economic transition in the Middle East, when the 
economies of the region –and in particular of the oil-producing states– were being ever more 
intimately incorporated into global capitalism, the US Army Corps of Engineers acted not only 
as a security arm of the US state, but also as an agent of geoeconomic transformation of the 
countries in which it operated. As trenchant accounts of political economy in Saudi Arabia have 
shown, the forging of Saudi infrastructures was crucial to the making and reinforcement of a 
capitalist order in which the exploitation of racialised and migrant labour, accumulation of capital 
through both transnational and local corporate bodies, and the internal protection of this system 
by repressive force became recognisable features of the system (Hanieh 2011; Jones 2010; 
Menoret 2015).  
Corps of Engineers projects on the Arabian Peninsula, and Saudi Arabia more specifically, put 
into place military facilities (e.g. air fields, military cities and bases) that could be used both by 
the US and Saudi militaries; but also significant numbers of civilian (or dual use) infrastructures 
(like radio, television and telecommunication networks, and auxiliary structures around bases 
such as desalination plants and electric stations).  Perhaps more significantly, the US Army Corps 
of Engineers’ construction programmes also implemented virtual infrastructures of capitalist 
economies. These included legal and regulatory dispositifs, private property and labour regimes, 
rules of accounting and standards of engineering, and the broad range of business management 
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activities –procurement, sales, marketing, contracting, and the like– that construe and make 
possible business activities.  
 
The US Army Corps of Engineers in the Arabian Peninsula 
In a 1902 essay titled “Persian Gulf and International Relations”, the great naval power 
enthusiast Alfred T Mahan wrote, 
In the general economy of the world, irrespective of political tenures, present or possible, 
the Persian Gulf is one terminus of a prospective interoceanic railroad. […] The railroad 
will be one link, as the Persian Gulf is another, in a chain of communication between 
East and West, alternative to the all-water route by the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. […] 
It will therefore serve particularly for the transport of passengers, mails, and lighter 
freights. On the other hand, for bulk of transport, meaning thereby not merely articles 
singly of great weight or size, but the aggregate amounts of freight that can be carried in 
a given time, water will always possess an immense and irreversible advantage over land 
transport for equal distances (2002: 217-8). 
The strategic significance of the Arabian Peninsula as a node of transport, transit, and commerce 
was already clear to the colonial powers of nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Though the ports 
in the Arabian Peninsula had long had a rich history of facilitating Indian Ocean trade and Hajj 
pilgrimage, the colonial conquest of Aden in the nineteenth century, and the twentieth century 
establishment of air fields in Sharjah as a way-station between Europe and India incorporated 
the Peninsula into Europe’s colonial capitalist sphere (Bose, 2006; Heard-Bey, 1982; Mathew, 
2016; Stanley-Price, 2012). Aden in particular was a significant coaling and, later, bunkering 
station, at one stage being the fourth most important ship refuelling port in the world (after New 
York, London and Liverpool; see Barak, 2015; Nizan, 1987).  But the discovery of oil in 
commercial quantities in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in the 1930s accelerated –with a brief hiatus 
during the Second World War– the process of capitalisation of the economies of the Peninsula.  
It is no surprise that the petroleum companies would be so centrally involved in the work of 
making infrastructures that would allow them to extract oil. ARAMCO in particular engaged in 
massive construction of transportation and communication infrastructures, utilities, and racially 
segregated labour camps and company towns (Vitalis, 2006; Mitchell, 2011). 
During the Second World War, the US Army Corps of Engineers transformed an ARAMCO air 
strip into an air field, and after the war turned it into an air base in Dhahran. From then on, the 
US Army Corps of Engineers became involved in the construction of infrastructures –both 
civilian and military– in Saudi Arabia. These projects included a civilian air terminal at Dhahran, 
television and radio broadcasting facilities, and upgrading Jidda’s municipal water supply in the 
wake of a catastrophic flash flood which had “inundated water wells, destroyed pumps and 
pumping plants, and washed out the pipelines in the system that supplied the city with water” 
(Grathwol and Moorhus, 2009: 340-341). However, their most substantial and enduring 
contribution to the forging of Saudi Arabian state infrastructure was the development of a series 
of “military cities” throughout the kingdom which were to pin the borders of the kingdom in its 
most contested borderlands, provide bases for the country’s nascent military branches (later to 
be used for joint operations along with the US), and perhaps more importantly result in the 
development of secondary support structures such as logistics lines, dedicated ports, cargo 
terminals and other maritime infrastructures, as well as the construction of desalination, sewage 
and electricity plants to provide utilities to the military cities. 
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The geopolitical role of the Corps of Engineers –as that of other branches and divisions of the 
US military– is well established, especially in wartime, when the Corps would help build up the 
military infrastructures of its allies with the guarantee that these facilities would be made available 
to the US military. However, the Corps’ peacetime activities overseas tend to be somewhat more 
unique to the US military in the post-Second World War era and would more easily fit within a 
geoeconomic rubric. Just as the US Army Corps of Engineers has been engaged in civilian 
construction projects at home (see for example Logel, 2016) it has also been involved in 
peacetime operations overseas to facilitate the establishment, modernisation, and infrastructural 
consolidation of allied militaries.  
At home, the Corps of Engineers (or its historical predecessor) was a crucial actor in the 
colonisation of the West and the settlement of indigenous lands (Shallat 1989, 1994). As both 
Nick Estes (2015) and Michael Lawson (1982) have argued, throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries the Corps’ large public works projects and its construction and management 
of waterways, irrigation, dams and levees in the United States worked in tandem with the official 
Indian Policy to dispossess and displace the land’s native populations. Its most major peacetime 
hydrological project overseas was the construction of the Panama Canal in early twentieth 
century, whose attendant regimes of racialised labour and imperial justifications were to haunt its 
project thereafter (Lindsay-Poland, 2003). Overseas, and especially beginning with the Second 
World War, the Corps of Engineers began largescale military and civilian construction projects 
throughout the Mediterranean and the global South (see US Army Corps of Engineers, 2008). In 
Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkey inter alia, the Corps was involved in building roads and 
other transport infrastructures that were meant to strengthen the alliance of these states, all of 
which were members of the Cold War era CENTO, the Central Treaty Organisation, formerly 
known as the Baghdad Pact (Adalet, 2018; Moore, 1969; Schubert, 1991; US Army Corps of 
Engineers, 1960; 2008). The strengthened alliance would of course support the US in the Cold 
War. The Corps’ civilian infrastructures projects often occurred in times of great political and 
socioeconomic transformation –for example US colonial expansion in the early twentieth 
century, or the Cold War– and were inextricably saturated with discourses of free markets, 
development, and modernity.  
In a US Army War College thesis written in 1991, Colonel Albert Kraus argues that in the post-
Cold War era, the US Army Corps of Engineers should enter bilateral engineering assistance 
agreements in order to address overseas environmental and economic disasters and aid 
developing militaries of the global South.  Kraus writes that in the context of changed strategic 
circumstances and “domestic fiscal constraints”, “one strategic initiative that would greatly help 
to address the emerging threats and challenges, and strengthen America's economy and security, 
is a substantial increase in bilateral engineer assistance” (Kraus, 1991: ii).  Where the Corps of 
Engineers was to be involved overseas, “the concept is not to try to build/rebuild an entire 
nation, but to help to put a country on the road to sustainable development through a systematic 
program of analysis, education, technology transfer, and corrective actions” (1991: 17). Kraus 
cites two historic examples of the kind of bilateral engineering assistance programmes that can 
show the way to the future.  What is fascinating is that both examples show that the Corps of 
Engineers became involved in a large-scale developmental programme whose intent was not 
only the transformation of military facilities, but a re-engineering of the economic and political 
relations of the countries in question in a time of great economic transition.  One example is 
Saudi Arabia, the subject of this article. Revealingly, the second example is the Support for 
Eastern European Democracy Act of 1989 which Kraus says “is designed to help Hungary and 
Poland transition to democracy and a market economy and will include efforts to help reduce 
severe environmental problems” (1991: 31-32).  The programme in the end resulted in large-
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scale engineering and logistics assistance, though almost all of it within the domain of military, 
rather than civilian, construction.  
The infrastructural role of the US Army Corps of Engineers in the Middle East, however, went 
far beyond the construction of military infrastructures and explicitly advanced goals of economic 
development via expansion of civilian infrastructures.  These contracts were financially lucrative 
for the US. A 1975 report assessing Army Security Assistance determined that engineering 
services were in fact more profitable than various other assistance services provided by branches 
of the US military:  
Engineer construction FMS [Foreign Military Sales] projects in Saudi Arabia represent a 
unique use of Army Engineer capability in the furtherance of US foreign policy. In view 
of the situation in other oil rich countries, increased demands for Army engineer services 
can be expected and national interests may be better served by promoting the use of 
Army engineers instead of commercial sales.4  
Historical accounts of contracts granted to the Corps of Engineers bear this out. The Corps’ 
work in Saudi led to countries near and far calling in the Engineers for large-scale transport 
infrastructure construction.  For example, they conducted a study of dredging in two Qatari 
ports (I have not found a record of whether or not they got the contract for its engineering or 
construction).5 Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, and Sudan all saw other projects by the Corps 
(Grathwol and Moorhus, 2009). They also eventually were intimately involved in the 
construction of a number of modern ports in Oman, including overseeing the expansion of 
Sultan Qabus port in Muscat, and at least some of the initial construction work in ports of Sohar 
and Salalah.6  
The Corps’ geoeconomic role occurred along a number of vectors.  First, Corps of Engineers 
construction projects occurred in concert and cooperation not only with private corporations 
involved in engineering, design, and construction; but also with US firms abroad which were not 
construction firms. The Corps of Engineers’ symbiotic relationship with ARAMCO in the 
former’s early stages of operation in Saudi Arabia is instructive in understanding the 
inextricability of military and commercial activities. Even more interestingly, the US Army Corps 
of Engineers not only subcontracted to local firms (as often required by local laws), but also 
brought in firms from allied countries from outside the Middle East. Second, and less remarked-
upon, the particular modalities of operation of the Corps of Engineers as a business are worthy of 
note. The Corps acted as a commercial agent of the Saudi Arabian government through 
overseeing the process of contracting with other actors; but even more importantly, the very 
methods, techniques, procedures, and practices deployed by the Corps, in its activities as both 
construction and contracting agent, wielded an infrastructural power to consolidate a capitalising 
dispositif.   
 
Corporate collaborations 
                                                 
4 “A Study on Army Security Assistance” (October 1975), p. A9; 870-5b Study on Army Security; 
Series 77-92-0001; Box 24 of 38; US Army Corps of Engineers Records; US National Archives. 
5 “Countries May Seek Corps’ Help”; Mideast Engineer (December 1978); 870 5b Mideast Engr 
Newspaper COE pub -78; Series 77-92-0002; Box 1 of 35; US Army Corps of Engineers 
Records; US National Archives. 
6 870-5b Oman File 1981; Series 77-92-0002; Box 32 of 35; US Army Corps of Engineers 
Records; US National Archives.  Critchfield Papers; Georgetown University Archives. 
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From the very beginning of US military involvement in the Arabian Peninsula, the various 
branches of the US military had depended on private firms for advancing their programme of 
logistical support and construction. During the Second World War, the US was primarily 
interested in northern Gulf and the supply route across Iran to the Soviet Union; in Saudi Arabia 
itself, the US Air Force put to use an air strip previously used by ARAMCO. ARAMCO had 
discovered petroleum in commercial quantities in Saudi Arabia in 1935. Given the absence of 
transport infrastructures in the region, it had used a rudimentary air strip for flying engineers 
around the region. The airstrip was used by the US Air Force during the Second World War and 
was incorporated into the air supply route to US forces fighting in the Pacific (Grathwol and 
Moorhus, 2009: 29). In the postwar period, the US decided to maintain control of the field. At 
this stage, the US minister to Saudi Arabia, Colonel William Eddy, negotiated the terms of the 
establishment of the airfield with the Saudi governments in 1945.  “A U.S. military team would 
construct the airfield and a 300-mile road from Dhahran to Riyadh (The Saudis wanted the 
paved road to go all the way across the country to Jeddah, but the War Department declined to 
make that commitment because there would be no military justification.) U.S. commercial 
airlines [specifically Transcontinental and Western Air Company or TWA] would have exclusive 
landing and transit rights” (Lippman, 2008: 158). In the case of the road, it was eventually 
constructed with the aid of ARAMCO, in a congenial division of labour. Eddy had the 
distinction of eventually leaving government service for work with ARAMCO.7 Once the 
construction of the air field began at the end of the 1940s, the US Army Corps of Engineers 
would not have been able to manage the process without the logistical support of ARAMCO 
and the use of their skilled craftsmen, equipment, and maritime transport infrastructure for the 
importation of materials needed for construction (Grathwol and Moorhus, 2009: 37). The 
construction company contracted by the Corps of Engineers to build the airfield was Fluor, 
which was also the preferred construction contractor for ARAMCO (Ibid: 32). 
The malleability of the reasoning given for the decisions regarding infrastructure construction in 
Saudi Arabia pointed to the indivisibility of commercial and security reasons in US policy-making 
broadly, but in the decisions of the Corps of Engineers more specifically. As Mark Neocleous 
has written in his Critique of Security (2008: 76-81), a central task of the security apparatus is the 
“fabrication of the economic order”. In some instances, the concept of military security acts as 
an alibi for economic exploitation; in other instances, commercial reasons are cited as excuses 
for militaristic raisons d’état. In Saudi Arabia’s case, ARAMCO’s peculiar position “illustrates 
how the institutional mechanisms of a modern political order are never confined within the 
limits of what is called the state” (Mitchell, 1991: 90). The roles of ARAMCO and the Corps of 
Engineers seem to have been overlapping, with the distribution of commercial, diplomatic, 
security, and developmental tasks not being easily designated as public or private; or as military 
or civil. Even the establishment of a military base thought to be part of the US Strategic Air 
Command could be folded into ARAMCO’s role with some tasks being allocated to the latter 
rather than to the institutions of the military. 
Beyond the formal establishment of the bases, there were all the ways in which military officers 
and ARAMCO shared resources of various sorts, especially scarce transportation resources. 
These exchanges began during the Second World War and even during the shortages managed 
by the Middle East Supply Centre (Wilmington, 1971).  For example, at the end of 1944, the 
ARAMCO annual report tells us, the Company received military trucks and cars to aid it in its 
massive construction; and conversely, the Company provided vast amounts of maintenance and 
                                                 
7 “Memo from William Eddy to Shaikh Yusuf Yasin on the Dhahran Airfield” (5 August 1945); 
William Mulligan Papers, Box 7, Folder 23; Georgetown Archives. 
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support for airfields, naval vessels, and a wide range of other military functions.8 In 1945, 
ARAMCO chartered planes from the US Army Air Transport Command, who willingly supplied 
planes and crew for flights, and in return, ARAMCO construction engineers provided reciprocal 
services to the US Army Corps of Engineers constructing the airfield at Dhahran and an 
emergency landing field at Duwaid.9 In the early 1960s, as the US Army Corps of Engineers 
began its programme of developing military installations and naval bases for the Saudi military, a 
great deal of their work was facilitated by ARAMCO intelligence and Trans-Arabian Pipeline 
(TAP-Line) resources in far-flung corners of Saudi Arabia, including ARAMCO-built roads, 
transport equipment, and the use of TAP-Line pumping-stations.10 As part of the expansion of 
Jubayl naval base and the establishment of an industrial area there, the Corps planned on putting 
out a contract for a water desalination plant to be built; and it entered deals with ARAMCO to 
provide sweetened natural gas for the production of electricity needed for the construction 
process.11 
By the 1960s and in the intensive reconstruction period following the Second World War, the 
dollar had overtaken the sterling as the dominant currency of world economy and eventually 
trade in oil (Citino, 2002; Galpern, 2009).  However, by 1960, US economic policymakers had 
become anxious about foreign holders of dollars “redeeming [their expatriated dollars] for gold 
from the U.S. Treasury, reducing American gold reserves and threatening the stability of the 
dollar. To limit the exodus of dollars, the Eisenhower administration and Congress imposed 
regulations on military spending overseas and encouraged the Department of Defense to use 
American products wherever possible” (Grathwol and Moorhus, 2009: 224-5). This change in 
monetary policy went hand-in-hand with the long-standing Congressional demand for US firms 
being the primary recipient of lucrative contracts not only at home but also abroad.   
As I wrote before, some of the most acute analyses of the US military’s contracting of military 
functions have emerged in the last two decades (Avant, 2005; Kinsey and Patterson, 2012; 
Kinsey, 2009; Singer, 2003; Stanger, 2009; Verkuil, 2007).  Much of this work focuses on the 
acceleration in granting of contracts brought about by the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP) in the 1980s (Singer, 2003; for investigative work on the problematic nature of 
LOGCAP contracts see Briody 2004; Chatterjee, 2004, 2009). But the Corps of Engineers had a 
much longer history of establishing relationships with engineering, contracting and construction 
firms, not only in its overseas construction work in the Middle East, but also through its 
engagement with mega-firms involved in large public works projects in the US.  
The earlier years of Corps of Engineers work in Saudi Arabia saw them drawing directly on 
ARAMCO or its contractors Fluor and Bechtel for many construction projects (on Bechtel see 
Denton, 2016; McCartney, 1988). Brown and Root, which had been involved in many 
construction projects for the US military in the Second World War (including shipyards) similarly 
won contracts from the Corps either as Brown and Root, or later as Kellogg, Brown & Root or 
                                                 
8 ARAMCO Annual Report 1944, Mulligan Papers, Box 3, Folder 43, Georgetown University 
Archives. 
9 ARAMCO Annual Report, 1945, Mulligan Papers, Box 3, Folder 43, Georgetown University 
Archives, pp. 19-20. 
10 “Memo for record, Site visit to Qaysumah, Saudi Arabia on 28 September 1964” (29 
September 1964); Folder 870-5b; Series 77-92-0002; Box 29 of 35; US Army Corps of Engineer 
records; US National Archives. 
11 Various records; Folder 870-5b Hist Src File SNEP; Series 77-92-0001; Box 4 of 38; US Army 
Corps of Engineers Records; US National Archives. 
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KBR (Pratt and Castaneda, 1999).  Morrison-Knudsen had been part of the same consortium 
(along with Bechtel) that was involved in the construction of the Hoover Dam, and many 
construction projects for the US in the Vietnam War. Parsons Corporation, which had built oil 
installation in Alaska’s North Slope and which eventually built the Yanbu port, also did a great 
deal of business with the US Army Corps of Engineers in Saudi and elsewhere. The US Army 
Corps of Engineers Archives contain many curricula vitae of engineers working for these firms 
who had come to their private sector jobs from the Corps.12 
While the Corps’ primary contractors often subcontracted to local firms in order to acquire the 
necessary labour force they required, the Corps also was compelled (sometimes by law, and 
sometimes through informal means) to contract directly with firms owned by Saudi businessmen 
and coteries of the ruling family. As Grathwol and Moorhus (2009: 163) recount in their history 
of the Corps,  
In negotiations, the Saudis insisted that a Saudi contracting company participate in the 
bidding for both the Dhahran terminal and the training school for the Royal Saudi Air 
Force in Riyadh. The Saudis made clear that they viewed these projects not as grants in 
aid but rather as the quid pro quo for the U.S. Air Force’s continued use of the military 
facilities at Dhahran. They wanted to ‘get their money’s worth’ out of the construction 
contracts.   
The beneficiaries of such contracts are now some of the largest firms in Saudi Arabia, including 
the Binladen Company, which was involved in the construction of a highway under Corps 
contract in the Asir province as well as in contracts to build air force bases, garrisons and other 
secret military infrastructure there.  This construction work helped the region to be more 
intimately incorporated territorially into Saudi Arabia and protected from the revolt of the 
nationalists in North Yemen (Coll, 2008: 115).  Michael Field’s colourful account of some of the 
wealthiest business families in the Peninsula (1985) points to the Alireza, Algosaibi, Juffali, 
Kanoo and Olayan family firms also enjoying the benefits of such construction contracts with 
the Corps. 
However, if the Corps of Engineers was compelled by US and Saudi political pressure to engage 
firms based in those countries, its process of granting contracts to non-US and non-Saudi firms 
shows the extent to which it acted as a significant actor in the process of capitalisation of Saudi 
Arabia and consolidation of global capitalism. Grathwol and Moorhus (2009: 403-4) recount 
how in 1975, the Corps for the first time granted a construction contract worth $22.2 million to 
a South Korean firm, Sam Whan, to build a workers’ camp in Jeddah. Shortly thereafter Miryung 
and Hyundai were also in receipt of other Corps contracts. Although the Corps contracts meant 
an explosion in demand for South Korean services in Saudi Arabia, the Corps had a much longer 
relationship with Korean construction and contracting firms. The US had engaged South Korean 
firms in its Vietnam War effort, and its overseas procurement contracts had provided a safe, 
“guaranteed market” for Korean goods and services, aiding that country’s further incorporation 
into global capitalist circuits (Glassman and Choi, 2014: 1163). Hyundai whose business took off 
during the Korean War by providing services to the US military, upgraded “its engineering skills 
under the tutelage of the US Army Corps of Engineers” in subsequent decades (Ibid: 1168). The 
company’s intimate relationship with the Corps meant that even as wars ended, they could be 
guaranteed contracts from the Corps first in Guam and later in Saudi Arabia (Ibid: 1172). By 
                                                 
12 “Saudi Arabian Engineer Assistance Program: Joint Venture Proposal; background info on 
contractors” (1964); Folder 870-5b Background Info; Series 77-92-0002; Box 14 Of 35; US 
Army Corps of Engineers Records; US National Archives. 
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1976, Saudi Arabia was “South Korea's fourth most important overseas market” (Disney, 1977: 
22). Further, between 1974 and 1980, “19.4 per cent of total contract amounts [for Korean 
firms] originated from either ARAMCO or the US Army Corps of Engineers” (Moon, 1986: 
622). 
The Corps largesse, then, not only opened “an excellent export market for US companies” 
(Whelan, 1981a), it also placed the Corps itself in the “statutory role of middleman in projects” 
(Whelan, 1981b).  The Corps projects –alongside the contracts granted by ARAMCO– had aided 
the creation of a global circuit of labour, capital, products, services and expertise that decidedly 
functioned according to a grammar of liberal capitalist order. 
 
The grammar of the capitalist geoeconomic order 
Even in its work in the continental United States, the work of the US Army Corps of Engineers 
had been fundamental to establishing new business practices. As Theodor Porter argues in his 
history of accounting practices in the US, although Military Engineers “lacked administrative 
authority over the vast net of railroads that spread across the North American continent in the 
nineteenth century” they were nevertheless “mainly responsible for the forms of accounting and 
administration through which railroad companies became prototypes of the modern, managed 
corporation in America” (1995: 150).  What the military engineers in particular contributed to 
modern accounting and management methods was the institutionalisation and routinisation of 
modern cost-benefit analysis with all its shortcomings and blind spots (including not accounting 
for social ills such as long-term ecological damage or human rights violations) and its connection 
to Taylorist forms of management (1995: 187). By the 1950s, the US Army Corps of Engineers 
had hired large cohorts of social scientists and economists to ensure that its engineering activities 
could be justified in the language of economic effectiveness and efficiency to those who wanted 
to keep it accountable. 
The Corps’ work in Saudi Arabia confounded any formally defined sectoral or military/civilian 
or even foreign/national boundaries. For example, even after the completion of its construction 
programme, “the Corps continued as the advising agency to the Saudi Arabian Ordnance Corps. 
In addition, the Corps continued its role in disbursing funds. The Saudis placed all orders to 
vendors and suppliers, but the Corps paid the invoices. The arrangement, intended to be 
temporary when the [construction project] began, became a permanent part of the Corps’ 
relationship with Saudi Arabia” (Grathwol and Moorhus, 2009: 333). The US Army Corps of 
Engineers not only acted as an arm of the Saudi state in contracting and disbursement of 
payments, it also became a purchasing agent (Ibid: 358), trainer for new engineers (Ibid: 340), the 
initiator of engineering and accounting standards, and the stipulator of legal contracts. 
The Corps’ definition of what sorts of contracts could be drawn up (not only between itself and 
various Saudi government agencies but also between itself and the engineering and contracting 
firms it engaged) also delimited the character of contracting in general for such large projects. 
The memoranda exchanged between Corps engineers in Saudi and abroad bristle with acronyms 
for legally complex forms of contractual obligation that the Corps’ legal officers would design 
and enforce.13 Beyond delineating the contours of contracting, the Corps administrative 
                                                 
13 See for example, “Letter Order Contracts”; “fixed price contracts form 1354 (Transfer and 
Acceptance of DoD Real Property)”; “GFE (Government Furnished Equipment)”; “O&M 
Contracts (Operation and Maintenance Contracts)”.  “Memo from Brigadier General James N 
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processes introduced new modalities of management both to its contractors and to the 
government. These included “the provision of modern supply control procedure”; “institution 
of modern maintenance management procedures”; “institution of a modern and effective system 
of logistics management”; procurement systems; management information systems; inventory 
systems; “requisition, issue, turn-ins, stock records, and allied transaction and record forms”14. 
The new managerial process also introduced information technology tools such as the automated 
Network Analysis System (Grathwol and Moorhus, 2009: 495) and its Cost/Schedule Control 
System (CS-Squared) (Ibid: 490-3) which was to become a nub of contention between it and its 
contractor. The Corps provided both its contractors and Saudi government agencies with 
“support and advice concerning maintenance, supply, automated data processing, contract 
administration, financial management, training, and construction” (Ibid: 579).  
In order for the Corps to construct the vast military cities it eventually did, as well as the other 
infrastructure projects that required access to public and private lands, the Corps had to secure 
the agreement of the owners of these lands. In most instances, the royal family would grant 
access to the Corps, both consolidating the Saud family’s hold over the land and providing the 
Corps with a carte blanche for the use of the space and expanding its reach beyond the bases.  
As one draft unpublished official Corps history claimed, the Corps’ negotiation of “off base 
land-leases and rights-of-entry to required lands” were “time-consuming, often frustrating, and 
always irritating to native populations”15. The Corps materials are sanitised but they show that 
these access rights could cause “irritation” because of encroaching on the seasonal movement of 
the Bedouin as well as possible expropriation of agricultural lands.16 The official history of the 
Corps in the Middle East briefly notes that “treaty provisions covering the acquisition of desert 
land eased the difficulties”, without reconciling this to the irritation the earlier draft history had 
noted, or indeed indicating which treaty covered the process of land acquisition (Grathwol and 
Moorhus, 2009: 39). It is also worth noting that desert lands were more likely held in common 
and the process of establishing a base there likely led to the parcelling and commodification (or 
enclosure) of that land. 
Perhaps more significantly, the Corps inserted itself into the Saudi labour regimes, and in many 
instances either transformed these systems, or reinforced forms of labour control and 
                                                 
Ellis to Lt. General J.W. Morris” (22 May 1979); Folder 870-5b; Series 77-92-0002; Box 2 of 35; 
US Army Corps of Engineers Records; US National Archives. 
14 “Mobility Modernization and Armaments Program for the Saudi Arabian Army (prepared by 
US Army Engineer Division)” (28 May 1966); Folder 870-5b Mobility Modernization and 
Armaments Program for SA (1966-1968); Series 77-92-0002; Box 11 of 35; US Army Corps of 
Engineers Records; US National Archives. 
15 “Chapter 1, The Crash Program 1949-1952” p. 29; History Draft Files; Series 77-92-02; Box 1 of 
35; US Army Corps of Engineers Records; US National Archives. 
16 While the archival material on Saudi Arabia does not contain very much information on the 
processes of land acquisition, Grathwol and Moorhus (2009: 39) write about the Corps project 
of building Wheelus Air Force base in Libya: “In Libya, acquiring land for U.S. military facilities 
represented a delicate problem. Arab attitudes toward land and tenacity in holding onto it made 
long-term leases more palatable than outright purchases. The need to resettle tenants required 
land acquisition away from the bases and provision of huts and water wells for the resettled 
people”.  The same source also recounts Moroccan worries about the Corps acquisition of land 
there and “whether the Americans would compensate land owners for the loss of crops” (2009: 
56). 
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exploitation introduced by ARAMCO before it.  The archival material contains a great deal on 
the labour regimes the Corps established or reinforced.  Often, the Corps would claim that it had 
no hand in how the labour was treated, since it hired contractors who in turn hired local 
subcontractors for labour provision. This included “importation” of labour for large 
construction projects in order to control the cost of the projects.  One account of the building of 
military cities stated  
Our third challenge is to isolate the project from the inflation prevalent in Saudi Arabia. 
This is important to use in order to control costs. It Is also important to our customer 
that our project is not the cause of increased inflation in other parts of the Kingdom. We 
achieve this isolation by obtaining all the materials and labor required for the job from 
sources which are not competitive with sources used by other projects In Saudi Arabia… 
We plan to import all the laborers that will be employed on this project. We estimate that 
approximately 20,000 personnel will be required at the peak of the construction of the 
city. Additionally, we must provide a complete life support system for these workers. 
This life support system includes all the required housing, messing, medical, recreational, 
and other facilities that will be required to keep our laborers happy during the time they 
are present at the site. The workers will have no access to other towns In Saudi Arabia 
and thus their wages will not be a source for fueling inflation within Saudi Arabia. At the 
same time they should find it relatively pleasant with all the facilities that will be provided 
for them.17 
When it came to wages, the dramatic difference between the wages of US vs foreign workers 
employed by contractors to work on Corps projects is instructive. For example, the 1964 wage 
rates of Greek personnel contracted and imported for work in Saudi Arabia was a fraction of US 
personnel. While US personnel would earn the equivalent of $6.35 hourly wage, the most highly 
paid Greek personnel, architects and engineers, would get paid $2.60 and $2.84 respectively. US 
administrative staff would earn $4.35 while the Greeks were paid $0.61 (with accountants at 
$1.28).18 
The process of isolating workers noted in the passage above echoed the segregation of labour 
forces pioneered by ARAMCO (Vitalis, 2006). As Vitalis has shown, a great many of the labour 
practices that have become associated with the exploitation of migrant workers in Saudi Arabia 
were devised in the early years of ARAMCO’s work there and were also adopted by the Corps. 
These included segregation of living quarters and the institution of a Jim Crow system with 
racialised hierarchies reinforced in health, education, leisure and housing of ARAMCO workers 
(and also workers on Corps projects). It is also notable that the US military more broadly (Li, 
2015; Lipman 2009) and the Corps of Engineers more specifically (Friedman, 2017; Lindsay-
Poland 2003) were instrumental in globally spreading a racialised hierarchy of labour perfected in 
Jim Crow US.  
In the end, both the wages and housing provisions reinforced a hierarchized, racialized 
workforce whose lower wages could be justified through the layers of contracting that kept 
Corps project costs low.  Like so much else that the Corps did, the wage rates and working 
                                                 
17 “Corps Experts and Saudi Arabian $’s are growing modern cities in the desert”. Engineer Update 
1(4), October 1977; Series 77-92-0001 Box 38 of 38; US Army Corps of Engineers Records; US 
National Archives. 
18 “Frank E Basil Inc.: Wage Rates in US Dollars”;  Saudi Arabian Engineer Assistance Program: 
Joint Venture Proposal; background info on contractors; Series 77-92-0002; Box 14 Of 35; US 
Army Corps of Engineers Records; US National Archives. 
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conditions were simply seen as how business was done. But in fact, the entire process, from 
design through implementation, reinforced a racialised capitalist modality of business and the 
unequal and exploitative labour system in operation in the country, and it incorporated the 




The immediate post-Second World War era saw a massive transformation in the politics and 
economies of Asia and Africa, as states struggled for independence from colonial rule and as US 
–and to a lesser extent its European allies– facilitated the capitalisation of the new states’ 
economies. This process of capitalisation depended primarily for its spread on the work of both 
transnational corporate actors and the local bourgeoisie, whether or not aligned with the Western 
Bloc or not. Transnational corporations were often backed by the force of former colonial and 
the new imperial powers. And the primary task in many of these newly capitalising economies 
was the establishment of physical and virtual infrastructures that would facilitate capitalist 
production, commodity extraction, and the circulation of goods and capital.  
The role of the US military in this process is less understood. It is now a truism that wars waged 
and won by the US and European powers were followed by economic and commercial contracts 
that benefited those powers. The militaries were seen as paving the way for such business 
transactions. What has been far less frequently commented upon and has been far less visible is 
that the peacetime overseas activities of the US military and its infrastructural power were 
fundamental in establishing a grammar of capitalist relations which introduced new modalities of 
economic management and administration to the newly capitalising countries. 
The most dramatic of these geoeconomic interventions has been the work of the US Army 
Corps of Engineers in the construction of both civilian and military communication and 
transportation infrastructures and forging a vast military machine in Saudi Arabia. The Corps 
brought with its construction projects a liberal capitalist dispositif: forms of regulation, contracting 
and sub-contracting, debt production, property acquisition, and standards of construction that 
provided an environment conducive to incorporation into capitalist networks and relations.    
This infrastructural power of militaries within a geoeconomic sphere brings into question our 
understanding of how power operates globally. Neat separations and conceptual boundaries 
between public and private, states and corporations, domestic and foreign, or civilian and 
military are all challenged by the geoeconomic work of the US Army Corps of Engineers in 
Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere. The activities of the Corps –not just in times of war but especially 
in peacetime– have been adjuncts to the work of corporations in crafting the grammar of global 
capitalism. This grammar has incorporated racialised regimes of labour, capitalist modalities of 
property ownership, an assemblage of laws, regulations, engineering standards, contracts and 
practices, and finally and most significantly a set of physical infrastructures that have facilitated 
the capitalisation of global economies. This geoeconomic role is distinct precisely because of the 
inextricability of notions of commerce and security; the co-imbricated relationship of the Corps 
not only with private firms (contractors, but also the parastatal ARAMCO), but also with the 
Saudi state itself, and the blurring of foreign/domestic boundaries when the Corps functioned as 
an agent of the Saudi state. 
Infrastructures and infrastructural power uniquely shed light on these blurred boundaries 
between heuristic binaries (public/private; state/corporation; domestic/foreign; 
civilian/military). Questioning these basic binary separations when studying organisations such 
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as the US Army Corps of Engineer, and the role it has played overseas, will help us better 
understand how the fundamental scaffolding of our world has been erected; and the ways these 
often invisible infrastructures reproduce and reinforce a liberal capitalist world order.   
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